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Abstract
It is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of individual choices. However, we must abandon the notion that rationality implies self-regarding behavior and the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforced by third parties.

Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of i

The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises.

The foundations of behavioral economic analysis was originally published as a single volume in 2016. In the new 7-volume issue the author has "done many of the same things we might have done in bringing out a second edition", including correcting errors and improving clarity of text. Each volume has the new preface and introduction and reprints the original preface

The domain of strategic interaction includes all those decision tasks in which the outcome of a decision depends on the decisions taken by a plurality of individuals, so that each individual must try to devise the most likely moves of the others in order to pursue the best course of action, knowing that all other actors are engaged in the same type of strategic thinking. Problems of strategic interaction in economics have been traditionally modelled using the formal language of game theory, first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern's 1944 seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Game theory subsequently developed into a highly formal mathematical language used to describe the behavior of hyperrational individuals in strategic contexts. Although born as a branch of applied mathematics and originally developed with the intention of making it the science of military conflict, its diffusion within economics has been extremely rapid, and related fields in the social sciences have recently begun to apply it to model behavior in a variety of social settings.